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Introduction
Over the last few decades, narratology has branched out into a wide array of 
‘post-classical’ narratologies (Herman 1999; Nünning & Nünning 2002) that have 
borrowed concepts from cognitive psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, 
linguistics, and so on. A question arises as to what extent ‘classical’ narratologi-
cal concepts that have hitherto been mainly applied to literary narratives can also 
be successfully exported to other disciplines which have an interest in narrative. 
Timothy R. Austin, for example, contends for the relationship between discourse 
studies and literary studies that “[w]here insights from one field are drawn on the 
other, the direction of flow seems almost invariably to be from discourse theory into 
literary criticism rather than vice versa” (Austin 1998, 705). In a similar vein, David 
Herman addressed this question with regard to cognitive narratology in a response 
to two papers by Zunshine and Vermeule presented at the MLA conference in 2003, 
and he observed that “whereas (at least some) literary analysts have adopted ideas 
from cognitive science to rethink their methods and objects of research, cognitive 
scientists still need to be convinced that borrowing tools from literary study might 
likewise be advantageous to them” (Herman 2003, 1). The same could be said of 
many social scientists who, it seems, are largely oblivious to the kinds of research 
that are conducted in narratology.
Social science disciplines have developed their own specific methodological 
tools for narrative analysis over the last few decades, for example, content analysis. 
Content analysis involves “the generation of categories which can be reliably coded 
and imposed over the data for the purposes of hypothesis testing” (Potter & Wetherell 
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1987, 41). The process of coding and the interpretation of coded narrative materials 
have been assisted and have even been made quantifiable by means of statistical 
tools such as N-Vivo or Q methodology. Q methodology, for example, is based 
on the assumption that “there will be a bounded set of propositions or concourse 
from which discourses are produced in order to make sense of the world at a given 
moment and place in history” (Dell & Korotana 2000, 290). Participants in a Q meth-
odological study sort statements relating to a topic in question, which are drawn 
from various discursive sources such as interviews, social science literature, media, 
and so on, and they are also invited to comment on these statements and on their 
own ordering criteria. While such methodologies constitute valid instruments for 
counting and accounting for the contents of people’s narratives, they do not answer 
the questions of how exactly these narratives are constructed and how, in discur-
sive and narratological terms, they achieve the effects they may have on listeners.
I must add the caveat that more discourse-oriented social science disciplines 
have addressed exactly those points and have made attempts to permeate their 
disciplinary boundaries (Potter 1996; Van Peer & Chatman 2001). One example 
is discursive psychology where strong emphasis is laid on the sequential verbal 
interaction of speakers and where methodological tools are borrowed from conver-
sation analysis. Sociolinguistics also pays close attention to linguistic features of 
talk-in-interaction and has investigated the work done in and through conversational 
storytelling for several decades now (Johnstone 1990; Labov & Waletzky 1967; 
Langellier & Peterson 2004; McConnell-Ginet & Eckert 1995; Norrick 2000; Polanyi 
1985). However, these disciplines are hardly representative of a much wider range 
of social sciences which undertake narrative research in various contexts such as 
health care, gender studies, politics, historical and anthropological inquiries and so 
on without close consideration of linguistic aspects, let alone narratological ones. 
It is precisely at this point that I see a potential for narratology to offer its concepts 
and tools to other disciplines. 
Through their common interest in narrative, sociologists, discourse analysts, 
psychologists, and many other social scientists could converge with narratologists 
and embark on joint scientific projects. However, the opposite appears to be the 
case: while literary scholars may consider narrative research conducted in the 
social sciences simplistic and may even question the use of the term narrative for 
oral stories of personal experience, sociologists, psychologists, and other social 
scientists look at the theoretical and terminological apparatus put forward by nar-
ratologists in disbelief and ask themselves: so what? How does that help us find 
out how narratives work in everyday life, what they mean to people, how people 
employ narrative and to what ends? 
In this article, I will apply the concept of focalization as well as Herman’s 
insights into doubly-deictic ‘you’ in second-person narratives (Herman 1994) to an 
interview narrative from my empirical sociolinguistic study on general practitioners’ 
narrative discourse on domestic violence (Mildorf 2002 and forthcoming) in order to 
elucidate the ways in which narratological terms and approaches can be helpful for 
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a more systematic investigation into oral narratives of personal experience. More 
specifically, I will consider how the narrative positioning of the GP as storyteller and 
‘protagonist’ of his story corresponds with his social and professional positioning 
with regard to his patients in the context of domestic violence cases and vis-à-vis 
the interviewer during the research interview. First, however, I will outline the terms 
focalization and double deixis. 
Focalization
Focalization is a widely discussed and not entirely uncontroversial concept in narra-
tology derived from photography and film. The term was first introduced by Gérard 
Genette (Genette 1980) to replace the even more troublesome concept of point of 
view. According to Genette, previous discussions of point of view or narrative per-
spective displayed “a confusion between the questions who is the character whose 
point of view orients the narrative perspective? and the very different question 
who is the narrator? – or, more simply, the question who sees? and the question 
who speaks?” (Genette 1980, 186; italics original). Focalization assumes the visual 
facet of these two key functions. 
Seymour Chatman refines the distinction between seeing and speaking by 
proposing the alternative terms “filter” and “slant”. “Filter” refers to narrative instances 
where the narrator “can elect to tell a part or the whole of a story neutrally or “from” or 
“through” one or another character’s consciousness” (Chatman 1986, 196). “Slant”, 
by contrast, encompasses the attitudes narrators may share with characters about 
people or events in the storyworld and which manifest themselves in narrators’ 
comments, judgements, and the like.1 Focalization or Chatman’s “filter” thus allows 
for both the perceptual facet including space and time, and the psychological facet 
including cognitive and emotive components (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 78–82). This 
can be illustrated by the following passage from Katherine Mansfield’s short story 
Bliss: 
It was dusky in the dining-room and quite chilly. But all the same Bertha threw off her 
coat; she could not bear the tight clasp of it another moment, and the cold air fell on 
her arms.
 But in her bosom there was still that bright glowing place – that shower of little 
sparks coming from it. It was almost unbearable. She hardly dared to breathe for fear 
of fanning it higher, and yet she breathed deeply, deeply. She hardly dared to look into 
the cold mirror – but she did look, and it gave her back a woman, radiant, with smiling, 
trembling lips, with big, dark eyes and an air of listening, waiting for something…divine 
to happen…that she knew must happen…infallibly (Mansfield 1983, 129).
1 Chatman adamantly denies narrators the possibility to see the storyworld literally. They can only 
relate what they perceive imaginatively or from memory. As Jahn (1996) points out, this insistence on 
the distinction of literal and non-literal perception is counterproductive since in actual practice to see 
something in one’s mind’s eye is an experience not essentially different from ‘really’ seeing something. 
Sociolinguistic Implications of Narratology
45
While there is a narrator telling us about Bertha, we do not look at her from a distance 
or from a bird’s eye perspective but the perspective adopted here is Bertha’s own. 
She experiences the chilliness of the room and she regards herself in the mirror, 
perceiving her own radiance, the trembling of her lips, and so on. In other words, 
whatever is observed in the room is focalized through Bertha, and we as readers 
are invited to look at the same things as if we were looking through Bertha’s own 
eyes. Moreover, we have access to Bertha’s state of mind and emotions: “she 
could not bear” the tight clasp of the coat; she felt a “bright glowing” in her bosom, 
and she “hardly dared to breathe” because of her overpowering sense of bliss. 
In Manfred Jahn’s scalar model of focalization (Jahn 1996; 1999), Bertha 
occupies the position focus-1; she offers the lens or ‘burning point’ through which 
parts of the storyworld are perceived. The room, Bertha’s reflection in the mirror, 
and so on consecutively occupy focus-2, or the areas of attention Bertha’s eyes 
focus on. Narratologists further distinguish between external and internal focaliza-
tion, where external focalization lies with an “anonymous agent” (Bal 1985, 105) 
outside the storyworld (commonly referred to as narrator2), and internal focalization 
with a character in the storyworld. In the example above we have a case of internal 
focalization. 
Although I used a literary example to illustrate the concept of focalization it 
would be wrong to assume that focalization only occurs in literary texts. On the 
contrary, one can contend that any text, whether fictional or factual, whether written 
or conveyed through other media, inevitably assumes a certain perspective on its 
given subject or topic. Jonathan Potter, for example, draws upon the concept of 
focalization to explain ways in which storytellers can invite listeners to adopt the 
position of the perceiver (Potter 1996). At the same time, storytellers come across 
as “entitled to provide an authoritative description of a scene or event because he 
or she is a witness” (Potter 1996, 165; italics original). In other words, focalization 
in conversational storytelling can contribute to a specific form of category entitle-
ment, which allows speakers to achieve their conversational goals. In that sense 
focalization becomes, as Mieke Bal argues, “the most important, most penetrating, 
and most subtle means of manipulation” (Bal 1985, 116).3 
Even in spoken personal narratives it would be therefore naïve to assume 
that the perspective adopted in a story is automatically that of the person telling 
the story. In fact storytelling itself needs to be approached with caution. Erving 
Goffman points out in his Forms of Talk (1981, 144 ff.) that, when people talk about 
‘speakers’, they usually have various things in mind: first, the notion of ‘speaker’ 
involves the technical or physical function of animator, that is, the fact that one uses 
2 I should mention here that, although the narrator and focalizer functions are separate, they can 
be combined in narrative texts. For an overview, see Phelan (2001).
3 This point is debated among narratologists. Genette’s original classification also allows for the 
possibility of what he calls “zero focalization”, which is an instance where the storyworld is not 
focalized through anyone in particular and the narrative thus remains ‘neutral’. I would agree with 
Bal that neutrality is impossible and that arguing in favour of such a notion mystifies the ideological 
thrust of a text (see also Bal 2002, 42).
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articulatory organs to produce sounds and that one thus functions as a ‘talking 
machine’. Secondly, ‘speaker’ also involves the idea of an author, someone who 
has selected the words spoken and the sentiments expressed therein. Thirdly, 
there is also the role of principal, which refers to the assumption that someone’s 
position or someone’s belief is established by the words that are spoken. Goffman 
cautions against a simplistic use of the term ‘speaker’, which implies a unity of 
these three functional roles. One can, for example, imagine someone reciting or 
reading out a text that was authored by someone else, or one can talk in someone 
else’s words and thus express some other principal’s opinions. I would go even 
further by arguing that very often we may not be aware of the fact that we are 
merely recycling someone else’s phrases or that we express views of which we 
do not really consciously know where they originally came from. Mikhail Bakhtin 
calls this process double-voiced discourse, and he maintains that the struggle with 
others’ discourse is important for “an individual’s coming to ideological conscious-
ness” (Bakhtin 1981, 348). All this implies that even immediate oral narratives are 
more complex than they may appear at first glance and that they consequently 
deserve more detailed linguistic analyses.
Double Deixis
The second narratological feature I consider in this paper is the concept of double 
deixis. Before I explain this concept, however, let me take a short detour by first 
defining second-person narratives, out of the context of which Herman’s notion 
emerged. Monika Fludernik provides the following criteria for second-person 
narrative:
For a text to be considered as a second-person narrative there has to exist a (usually 
fictional) protagonist who is referred to by an address pronoun. Situations that lend 
themselves to initiating such a state of affairs include the invocation of the character and 
his story in a kind of extended apostrophe […]; the projection of the current addressee 
as the actant in a projected story […]; or the modulation of generalized you and the 
function of address to the “real” reader who thus participates within the fictional action 
(Fludernik 1994, 302).
For an illustration of this peculiar narrative phenomenon, consider the following 
example quoted in Phelan (1994, 356). It is the beginning of Lorrie Moore’s short 
story “How”:
Begin by meeting him in a class, a bar, at a rummage sale. Maybe he teaches sixth 
grade. Manages a hardware store. Foreman at a carton factory. He will be a good 
dancer. He will have perfectly cut hair. He will laugh at your jokes.
 A week, a month, a year. Feel discovered, comforted, needed, loved, and start 
sometimes, somehow, to feel bored. When sad or confused, walk uptown to the movies. 
Buy popcorn. These things come and go. A week, a month, a year.
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This kind of narrative raises a number of questions. To whom is the story addressed: 
the unnamed protagonist, the narratee, the reader? What effect does this form of 
address have on the communicative situation and on us as participants in this 
communication? Phelan contends that:
 [s]ome of “what happens to us” when we read “How” depends upon our dual perspective 
inside the fiction, on the way that we step into and out of the enunciatee position, while 
we remain in the observer position and discover what the narrator assumes about our 
knowledge and beliefs in the enunciatee role. Furthermore, moving into the enunciatee 
role means that we move into the ideal narrative audience – the narrator tells us what 
we believe, think, feel, do – while in the observer role we evaluate our position in the 
ideal narrative audience (Phelan 1994, 356).
In other words, second-person narratives draw us into the story as we inevitably 
identify to a certain extent with the ‘you’ addressed in the narrative. A paradox is 
thus created: while we can keep a distance by observing how the text implicitly 
creates an audience for itself, we already also become members of that audience 
and are lured into participating in the storyworld.4 In complex second-person narra-
tives, ‘you’ can be dilated to such a degree that it is no longer possible to ascribe it to 
a specific referent, whether intradiegetic or extradiegetic. Herman (1994) discusses 
this problem in Edna O’Brien’s A Pagan Place. He draws up a list of five discourse 
functions of ‘you’:
1. generalized you
2. fictional reference
3. fictionalized ( = horizontal) address
4. apostrophic ( = vertical) address
5. doubly deictic you
Generally speaking, these functions can be further categorized according to whether 
there is agreement between the morphosyntactic form of ‘you’ and its textual 
functions or not. Thus, instances where the ‘you’ encodes the participant role of 
addressee display full agreement, for example, in narratives where an intradiegetic 
narratee (horizontal address) or the reader (vertical address) is invoked. Complete 
disagreement of ‘you’ and its deictic functions results in what Herman, following 
Margolin (1984), calls deictic transfers, for example, from ‘I’ to ‘you’ as when a 
first-person protagonist refers to him/herself as ‘you’ in the narrative, or when ‘you’ 
comes to stand in for an impersonal, generalized ‘you’ equivalent to ‘one’ in English 
(as in: ‘One should wash oneself regularly’, DCE). Cases of doubly-deictic ‘you’, 
by contrast, show neither full agreement nor disagreement or, put differently, they 
make use of all possible functions to a lesser or greater extent. Thus doubly-deictic 
‘you’ renders the referential framework within which ‘you’ is employed ambiguous. 
4 The same is more or less true of any narrative, especially if it is written in a captivating manner. 
However, in second-person narratives the role(s) of the recipients are foregrounded more strongly 
through the direct address.
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One of Herman’s examples is the following text passage from A Pagan Place 
where the actions of a masturbator in a hotel room next to the one of the protago-
nist are described: “you heard panting from the next room, the amateur actor’s 
room. It was like something you had heard before, distantly, a footprint on your 
mind, you didn’t know from where” (A Pagan Place, 169–170; quoted in Herman 
1994, 398). In this passage, Herman argues, the audience finds itself conflated with 
the fictional self addressed by ‘you’, as the readers’ own experiential memories of 
similar events may be actualized by the description. Herman then concludes by 
saying that the “deictic force of you is double; or to put it another way, the scope of 
the discourse context embedding the description is indeterminate, as is the domain 
of participants in principle specified or picked out by you” (Herman 1994, 399). 
All this is well for the study of literary narratives, I can hear sceptical readers say, 
but so what? How can the concept of double deixis be operationalized for the study 
of oral narratives? Again, linguists have already proposed dialogical accounts of 
multiply deictic pronouns. Anne Salazar Orvig, for example, challenges a univocal 
identification of personal pronouns by demonstrating their context-dependent 
dynamic shifting in medical interviews (Salazar Orvig 1999, 119–153). Salazar Orvig 
observes that the displacement (“déplacement”) or gliding (“glissement”) of the ref-
erential meanings of personal pronouns frequently correlates with changes in time 
or types of discourse, and that speakers ‘play’ with multiple deixis in order to achieve 
specific discursive effects (Salazar Orvig 1999, 144). How can the identificatory 
and referential shifts indexed by people’s pronoun usage be correlated with shifts 
in perspective or mode of focalization? Before I move on to the analysis of double 
deixis and focalization in the narrative I have selected, let me provide some back-
ground information concerning the study from which the sample narrative is taken.
The Data
The narrative is one of 36 narratives elicited in in-depth interviews with twenty 
general practitioners in the City of Aberdeen, Scotland, which I conducted between 
April and July 2000 (Mildorf 2002 and forthcoming). In the interviews I discussed 
with the doctors their experiences with cases of intimate partner violence with a 
view to identifying the narrative constructions of their attitudes, perceptions and 
knowledge concerning the problem. The interviews were between 14 and 34 minutes 
long, with most interviews lasting for about half an hour. I taped and transcribed 
all interviews and selected the narratives according to predefined criteria derived 
from Robinson & Hawpe (1986), who define a prototypical story as a story that 
“identifies a protagonist, a predicament, attempts to resolve the predicament, the 
outcomes of such attempts, and the reactions of the protagonists to the situation. 
Causal relationships among each of the story elements are also explicitly identified 
in the prototype” (Robinson & Hawpe 1986, 112). Talk from the interviewer has 
been cleaned up and transcription conventions are kept to a minimum in order to 
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enhance readability. The focus is on the narrative as such, rather than on its embed-
dedness within a stretch of conversation, where my responses as the interviewer 
consist primarily of supportive back-channels such as ‘mhm’ and ‘yeah’. Line breaks 
follow the typology of narrative clauses proposed by Labov & Waletzky (1967).
Questions in the interviews were freely worded around the following topics: 
reasons, backgrounds, definitions, signs, consultation, time, training, status in the 
health care setting, measures, doctors’ role. Some narratives were elicited, they 
were told in response to questions such as ‘Can you tell me about your experiences?’ 
or ‘Is there any case that’s particularly vivid in your memory?’. Most narratives, 
however, were spontaneous in that they were related in contexts where I had not 
explicitly asked for a story. The narrative that I selected for this essay was related 
by a middle-aged male GP in a suburban practice in response to the question ‘How 
do you feel when you encounter domestic violence in a patient?’, and it illustrates 
many GPs’ frustration with a situation where they ‘cannot do much’:
 Narrative
 1.  we’ve got, uhm, one couple in the practice who are both, uhm, alcoholics 
 2 .  and she’s the victim of, uhm, violence, uhm, 
 3.  and you, ach, I don’t know, 
 4.  and it always seems to happen when they’re on a bender 
 5.  but, uhm, but, er, he hits her, 
 6.  he punches her 
 7.  and kicks her and [pause] 
 8.  and you still, I, I think you still feel sympathy for, for what’s happened
 9.  but, uhm, I think it’s frustration as much as anything, 
10. you think, ‘Well, why do they do that? Why stay on? Why keep drinking?’ 
11. but, you know, it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s their life really. 
12. That’s the way it’s always been, 
13. and it isn’t something that can be changed usually.
Focalization, Perceptual Windows 
and Category Entitlement
As the narrator of this story, the GP opens a “perceptual window” (Jahn 1996; Ryan 
1987) for me, the listener, and invites me to ‘look at’ the storyworld from the same 
perspective. In narratological terms, the GP assumes two functional positions in 
this story: on the one hand, he is the narrator who relates his patients’ story. At 
the same time, in his role as family doctor, he is also a participant or actor in this 
story, albeit ‘invisible’ throughout most of the narrative. As character in the story, 
the doctor functions as the focalizer, since the events described are viewed from 
his perspective. From his position as narrator he also takes himself into focus. In 
Jahn’s terms, the GP inhabits both focus-1 and focus-2. 
The actors in this narrative are introduced to the listener, namely as ‘one couple’. 
What strikes one in the first introductory line is the fact that victim and perpetrator 
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are presented as one entity, ‘one couple’, who ‘both’ belong to the same category 
of people, ‘alcoholics’. It is only in line 2 and later in lines 5 to 6 (‘he hits her’, ‘he 
punches her’) that the partners are discussed individually. In line 2, the GP states 
that the woman is ‘the victim of violence’. By using the definite article ‘the’, the 
GP clearly specifies the victim’s role whereas the perpetrator is completely left 
out. There is no mention yet as to who perpetrates the violence. In other words: 
salient information about the storyworld is withheld from the listener for reasons of 
discomfort about a topic which is still a taboo for many people, or simply to create 
suspense in the ‘plot line’ of the narrative. 
However, the listener in this situation adopts the role of what Graesser et 
al. (2001) call a “multiagent reader”,5 that is, a recipient who is sensitive to the 
knowledge propagation of a narrative by keeping track of the narrative agents 
and of their knowledge states. I as the interviewer could of course infer who the 
perpetrator of the violence was since I had knowledge of the interview topic and 
expected the GP as the narrator to present relevant agents. Nevertheless, since 
the GP does not focus on the violent husband in the field of vision (or focus-2) he 
presents to me, he indirectly not only conveys a biased and incomplete picture but 
also invites me to view this part of the storyworld from the same perspective.
Another interesting feature in the first two lines is the GP’s cautiousness in 
introducing this story, which indicates a high degree of self-consciousness and 
awareness of the interview situation. Thus, the hesitation marker ‘uhm’ occurs 
several times. Significantly enough, it is placed right before the nouns ‘alcoholics’ 
and ‘violence’, which can be interpreted as the GP’s reluctance to speak about 
such problematic issues with the interviewer. One must always bear in mind that 
the GP might have felt inhibited by the fact that he spoke to a young female re-
searcher and thus perhaps considered certain issues ‘inappropriate’ or ‘unsuitable’ 
topics. The nouns are phonetically separated from the remaining discourse and 
thus appear to be more stigmatized lexical items. Line 3 contains the interjection 
‘ach’, which linguistically encodes a sigh, and is immediately followed by the hedge 
‘I don’t know’, which can almost be regarded as a disclaimer to the evaluation the 
GP wants to make at this point but then elides. 
The narrator is not sure about the exact background of the violent incidents 
occurring between his patients: ‘it always seems to happen when they’re on a 
bender’ (line 4). The verb ‘seems’ qualifies the perceived actions as not entirely 
certain because they are subject to the restricted field of vision of the doctor. Here 
one can see a significant difference between fictional and conversational stories: 
while fictional narrators can technically make up any aspect of the storyworld they 
relate, narrators of stories of personal experience are expected to meet the “criteria 
of truthfulness”, as Genette puts it, that is, “to report only what you know for a 
fact, to report only what is pertinent, and to say how it is that you know these 
5 The term ‘reader’ obviously needs to be interpreted broadly here to include conversational story 
recipients.
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things” (Genette 1990, 763). The verb ‘seems’ attests to the GPs’ lack of first-hand 
knowledge of the violent incidents and also continues the theme of uncertainty 
started in the previous line (‘ach, I don’t know’). In other words: the GP as narrator 
does not have full access to all parts of the storyworld and can only tentatively 
conjure up the conditions under which violence occurs. At the same time, however, 
the GP asserts through the intensifying adverb ‘always’ that violence is intricately 
related to the alcohol problem that both partners have. Moreover, the partners are 
again viewed as one entity, which can be seen in the third person plural pronoun 
‘they’. Thus violence is indirectly attributed equally to both partners and agency is 
blurred, which is later used by the GP to justify his own inactivity in this case. 
The narrative gains speed in lines 5 to 7 through the narrator’s use of three 
extremely short main clauses: ‘but, uhm, but, er, he hits her, he punches her and 
kicks her and [pause]’. This section is introduced with the co-ordinating conjunction 
‘but’, which normally indicates an opposite or adversative sense expressed in the 
co-ordinated clause. As Deborah Schiffrin points out, “but marks an upcoming unit 
as a contrasting action” (Schiffrin 1987, 152; original emphasis). This does not 
apply here, though. Instead, the discourse co-ordinator ‘but’ is combined twice 
with the hesitation markers ‘uhm’ and ‘er’ and thereby seems to delay the telling of 
the actual violent incidents in lines 5 to 7. The violent action as such is emphasised 
through a number of rhetorical devices which contrast sharply with the GP’s initial 
hesitation. First of all, the verbs expressing violence are ordered in what I would 
perceive as a climax from the fairly unmarked term ‘hit’ through the more marked 
expression ‘punch’ to the most marked verb in terms of degree of violence, ‘kick’. 
These action verbs form the nucleus of three minimally-sized main clauses that 
are presented through syntactic parallelism. The structural presentation of these 
clauses enacts the action expressed in them, namely, a violent and quick lashing 
out. Agency is not blurred anymore: there are no passive constructions and the 
perpetrator is explicitly mentioned. 
Narratologically speaking, this sequence is very interesting as it calls into 
question Genette’s “criteria of truthfulness”, which I mentioned above. While the 
GP concedes his lack of first-hand knowledge through his tentative presentation 
of the patients’ violent life in the preceding lines, he now relates the events as 
though he had direct perceptual access to a violent scene. As with a close-up, 
the presented events gain in clarity and concreteness, and the narrative window 
opened onto the scene allows the listener to ‘visualize’ (albeit only imaginatively) 
the events almost like an eye witness. One should note that the events described 
here need not refer to a specific episode but may also stand in as summarized 
examples of numerous similar and repetitive occurrences. The present tense of the 
verbs, which is usually used to express common or iterative action, points towards 
this interpretation. However, the conception of the sequence as a ‘report’ rather 
than a ‘narrative’ hardly diminishes the vividness of the actions. And it is this vivid 
presentation which seems to be at odds with the fact that the GP cannot possibly 
have ‘seen’ those events. At best, they may have been related to him by his patient 
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during the consultation, but this part of the story is left out. In other words, the 
narrator in this case is hardly different from a fictional narrator, who also creates a 
mental image of a storyworld for readers/listeners through storytelling.
So what is the mode of focalization in this sequence of narrative clauses and 
what are its functions? Do we want to say that the events are either externally 
focalized or non-focalized, that they are perceived by an omniscient third-person 
narrator? This would not make sense as the overall narrative is cast as a first-person 
narrative of personal experience. Likewise, to assume internal focalization through 
some unnamed witness would be misguided as the GP as a real-life narrator could 
not have access to events at which he was not present. And yet, the narrative 
presents the events as though these types of focalization were possible and thus 
displays the same narratorial “infractions” that Edmiston (1989) has identified for 
fictional first-person narratives. Such infractions allow conversational storytellers to 
create involvement by bringing events and people in the storyworld ‘closer’ to the 
listener, much as focalization in fictional narratives arguably establishes a vicinity 
between reader and character(s).
In this particular example, the mode of focalization can be said to present the 
violence in a more dramatic and perhaps more shocking way,6 thereby not only 
expressing some of the helplessness and lack of comprehension of the GP himself 
but also aiming at evoking similar feelings in the listener. This pattern, however, is 
discontinued in the following resolution where the fast, violent action is brought 
to a stop. After a lengthy pause, which is the culmination point of the narrative 
and which at the same time offers the GP time to contemplate the case, he starts 
evaluating the narrative with regard to the question in response to which the story 
was told: ‘How do you feel when you encounter domestic violence?’. ‘You still feel 
sympathy’ is the answer this GP offers. Here one can see the mechanisms of 
category entitlement I mentioned above. The use of focalization also confers on 
the GP the authority of a witness (although his perceptions as witness are limited 
to ‘second-order’ information which he presumably received through the patient’s 
own narrative). This authority allows him to justify to the listener his evaluation 
of the case (along the lines of ‘I know what I am talking about: it’s really bad’) 
and his resulting feelings of helplessness and sympathy as well as, ultimately, his 
inactivity.
Deictic Shifts, Distancing and Listener Involvement
The most striking feature in the narrative as far as deixis is concerned is the shift 
from the first person pronoun ‘I’ to the generic pronoun ‘you’, which can both be 
said to refer to the narrator (I think you feel sympathy…). On this interpretation, the 
narrative offers an example of Margolin’s and Herman’s “deictic transfers” because 
6 To gauge the effectiveness of these clauses, compare them to the following conceivable variation 
on the narrative: ‘The patient told me that her husband regularly abused her physically’.
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‘you’ is no longer used solely in its proper deictic function as address form. The 
generic ‘you’ is used whenever the GP talks about himself as a character inside 
the narrative’s storyworld. Thus it is the GP himself who, in his role as family doctor, 
feels ‘sympathy for what’s happened’. As a character-focalizer in his narrative of 
this specific case the GP feels sympathy, but he also reflects on his feelings from 
his current perspective as the doctor who is telling the story. In other words, the 
current perspective of the narrator, from which the story is evaluated, is expressed 
in the personal pronoun ‘I’ whereby the GP also locates himself within the interview 
frame. This can be seen again in the difference between ‘I think’ in line 9 and ‘you 
think’ in line 10. In line 9, the GP evaluates the narrative from his current perspective 
as the narrator who is outside the story (‘I think you still feel sympathy’), whereas in 
line 10, he evaluates the case from within the story in his role as family doctor (‘you 
think, ‘Well, why do they do that?...’). In Chatman’s terminology, the GP as narrator 
has a particular “slant” on the events he narrates, while the life of his patients is 
also “filtered” through him as an actor or character in the storyworld. However, the 
referential function of ‘you’ in this case is not entirely clear. 
As I discussed above, the referential function of ‘you’ normally excludes the 
speaker and either addresses one person or a group of two or more people. In 
English, ‘you’ can also express a non-specific group of people comparable to that 
comprised in French ‘on’ and German ‘man’. Here, the generic pronoun ‘you’ gen-
eralizes the GP’s feelings and thereby implies that other people would probably 
feel the same. Thus one could argue that ‘you’ may equally refer to any person, 
that means it is used in the sense of the generalized pronoun ‘one’. If the pronoun 
retains even a small residue of its original semantic value it can also be regarded 
as a means of self-address. Understood in this sense, the doctor, by using ‘you’, 
seems to implicitly distance himself from himself and from the whole situation and 
immerses himself in an unspecified group of people. Put differently, he signals 
linguistically that the feelings he has are universal and do not solely apply to this 
couple. 
At the same time, the GP justifies his distancing by presenting it as generally ac-
ceptable behaviour. The GP in fact reinforced that notion later in the interview when 
he stated that feeling sorry for victims of any description was part of ‘human nature’. 
The fact that the GP answered the question about his own personal feelings in a 
situation where he encounters intimate partner violence in patients in general and 
indeed generic terms, can be interpreted in two ways: first, it might indicate the 
GP’s reluctance to speak openly about his emotions in the formal context of the 
interview; secondly, the GP offers a general statement because he assumes that 
sympathy for victims is an emotion generally expected of people and perhaps even 
more of doctors, and thus needs to be addressed in the interview. 
Interestingly enough, however, the sympathy mentioned in the narrative is not 
directed towards the victim but instead towards ‘what’s happened’, the incident 
in general. Similarly, agency is attributed to both parties when the doctor asks 
himself: ‘Why do they do that?’, thereby implicitly making the victim partially re-
sponsible for the situation. The underlying question ‘why do they stay?’, which is 
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indirectly repeated and thus emphasised, points towards the GP’s puzzlement, and 
it also underlines his ‘frustration’ (line 9) with an unsatisfactory situation, unsat-
isfactory because the GP cannot do anything. The final clause in line 13 (‘and 
it isn’t something that can be changed usually’) avoids any attribution of agency 
by employing a passive construction, thereby evading the potentially threatening 
question: ‘changed by whom?’.
Since the communicative situation was an interview, which is commonly based 
on the linguistic interaction of (at least) two participants, ‘you’ might even be in-
terpreted in its proper function as address pronoun. On this interpretation, ‘you’ 
refers to me as the interviewer, and the implication is that the feelings and thoughts 
depicted in the narrative could potentially also apply to me. In other words, I would 
probably also feel sympathy and think ‘Why do they do that?’ if I were placed in 
a similar situation. The fact that feelings of sympathy and disbelief about other 
people’s seemingly irrational behaviour are shared by many people and thus may 
well belong to my experiential repertoire as well, supports the inclusive interpreta-
tion of ‘you’ = interviewer/listener. This additional facet to the semantic range of the 
second person pronoun in the narrative demonstrates that the a priori values attrib-
uted to pronouns need not be in opposition to one another but can be conceived of 
as flexible points on a continuum. These points may converge or diverge, thereby 
assuming new values depending on the context in which they are used. As Salazar 
Orvig succinctly puts it: “Les glissements, les déplacements, les alternances entre 
JE et ON / VOUS se construisent à partir des potentialités sémantico-référentielles 
de ces unités et en même temps, ces déplacements et ces alternances leur 
confèrent de nouvelles valeurs”7 (Salazar Orvig 1999, 151). 
The ambiguity of doubly-deictic ‘you’ makes it possible for speakers to use 
the pronoun strategically. Thus, the facet of generalized ‘you’ implies the GP’s 
position vis-à-vis himself and other people. The GP can distance himself from 
his own, more personal self and move towards a more generalized, and perhaps 
more professional, self. The facet of vertical address including the listener allows 
a displacement or ‘gliding’ towards the interlocutor. This creates involvement and 
can function as a bonding device, whereby the listener is invited to identify with 
the predicaments of the speaker. The GP indirectly addresses me, the interviewer, 
in order to signal to me that I may feel the same under similar circumstances. 
This strategy may also be used to circumvent possible threats to one’s face wants 
posed, for example, through criticism. 
The GP’s linguistic behaviour towards the end of the narrative supports the as-
sumption that he might have suspected, and consequently tried to deflect, potential 
criticism on my part. The emphatic adverb ‘really’, together with the discourse 
marker ‘you know’, for example, is used here in its phatic function to create involve-
ment with the listener. It is a bonding device by which the narrator tries to gain the 
7 “The gliding movements, the displacements, the alternations between JE and ON/VOUS emerge 
from the semantic-referential potentialities of these [discourse] units and at the same time they 
confer on them new values” (my translation).
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interviewer’s approval of his point of view. The GP wants to make a point about the 
fact that distancing is the only solution since he cannot change the violent situation 
as such: ‘it’s always been’ like this (line 12) and ‘it isn’t something that can be 
changed usually’ (line 13). By using the generalising adverbs ‘always’ and ‘usually’, 
the doctor reconstructs the violence in his patients’ life as something irremediable 
and as an almost ‘normal’ factor in their more or less deviant circumstances, and 
thus he justifies his own reluctance to intervene.
Let us turn to other materials from the interviews and see how doubly-deictic 
‘you’ is used there. Consider the following examples:
1. Uhm, but mostly it’s, it’s the, the scenario that things aren’t, that the patients have 
said things aren’t going well and they’ll tell you that the, their partner sometimes hits 
them, say, when they’re drunk or, or that sort of thing. Sometimes they’ll tell you in 
retrospect, you know, that they’ve left him because obviously he was just ‘lifting the 
hand’, that’s always what they say up here. ‘He was lifting his hand and, uhm, that’s 
why I left.’ And, uhm, that’s quite common as well that they sometimes don’t want 
to tell you actually at the time. Sometimes they do.
2. Now, it’s, it makes a point, that story. A very big point. You can’t make outright 
assumptions that men are bad, right?
3. Well, it was quite, och, I think, the problem was that we never knew what happened. 
You know, you never know how, how things turned out in the long term.
4. I do a lot of onward referral. Because my own particular skills in domestic violence, 
[I wouldn’t say, are] brilliant. Having said that, you know, that the other issues sur-
rounding domestic violence [as] a GP, [issues of] depressive illness you can deal 
with because that, that, that’s your job. But any other particular issues, you’ve got 
to move on. So, no, I would nae-, I think we should always [have] our awareness 
increased just as we should have our awareness increased for any condition. But 
you can’t be formally trained on every condition.
5. You can be aware all your life but, you know, unless there is some sign that, that 
will prompt you to ask a question then, you know, I’m not gonna ask every woman 
that comes in, you know, uhm: “By the way [laughs] how are things at home?”, you 
know. Er, “any bruises under your clothes that you want us to have a look at?” – no, 
you can’t do that. You can’t do that. I mean, you know, that, that becomes almost 
abusive in its intrusiveness. And I don’t think we have that mandate.
These interview excerpts are interesting as they illuminate the various ways that 
‘you’ can be employed. In the first example, ‘you’ first and foremost refers to the GP 
herself because it is her own personal work experiences she talks about. However, 
by using ‘you’ rather than the first person pronoun, the GP creates a distance 
between herself as the narrator of these experiences and herself as the person 
having these experiences. At the same time, her account is depersonalized and 
generalized. This corresponds with other discursive features which make this 
account sound like a general description, for example, the quantifying adverbs 
‘mostly’, ‘sometimes’, ‘always’ and the predicate ‘quite common’, which suggest that 
the related events are not unusual. By using generic ‘you’, the GP implies that other 
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doctors may well have similar experiences with intimate partner violence in their 
practices. In example (3), the same strategy is employed to suggest that GPs in 
general have the problem of the unfinished story, that is, that they rarely know the 
outcome of such cases. 
Examples (4) and (5) are particularly interesting as they not only display the 
switch from first to second-person pronouns but also from the first-person singular 
to first-person plural pronoun. In (4), the GP first talks about what he usually does 
when faced with a domestic violence case, but he switches to ‘you’ as soon as he 
starts to make comments about medical practitioners in general. Thus the phrases 
‘issues of depressive illness you can deal with’, ‘that’s your job’ and ‘you’ve got to 
move on’ can be paraphrased by adding ‘as a GP’. A sense of community is thus 
evoked, which is reinforced through the first-person plural pronoun ‘we’. Here the 
GP clearly signals group identity by using the collective but also exclusive person 
marker. At the same time, he demonstrates his entitlement to speak on behalf of 
his professional group. As Margolin points out:
 
the question immediately arises whether or not the speaker(s) are empowered to speak 
on behalf of the reference class as a whole, thus conveying a joint/common com-
municative intent. If they do, they are speaking for the group, not only about it, and their 
utterances possess the status of group or collective speech acts (Margolin 2001, 243; 
italics original).
Interestingly enough, however, the GP then gives up this exclusive pronoun in 
favour of ‘you’ again: ‘you can’t be formally trained on every condition’. Bearing 
in mind what I said above about the inherent address function of ‘you’, I would 
interpret the GP’s use of ‘you’ here as a move towards greater inclusiveness and 
thus as an attempt at convincing me as the interviewer of his predicament, namely 
lack of training due to a heavy workload. 
Example (5) shows the same mechanism. Again, ‘you’ is used whenever the 
GP makes generalizing statements which supposedly not only refer to other GPs 
but also try to involve me in the general group of people evoked by ‘you’. Thus the 
GP implies that no-one has the right to be intrusive by asking delicate personal 
questions. The pronoun ‘we’ at the end shifts attention from the linguistically un-
derspecified, general group of people to the very clearly demarcated professional 
group of general practitioners. As in the previous examples, the pronouns thus 
allow the GP more or less well-defined positionings, depending on, for example, 
how sensitive the discussed issues are or how strong a statement he wants to make. 
Conclusion
The close analysis of focalization and deictic shifts of pronouns, in particular the use 
of ‘double deixis’, in the narrative and other interview materials reveals that these 
features are employed as strategies to fulfill (at least) the following two functions 
Sociolinguistic Implications of Narratology
57
on various levels of the narrative: distancing and bonding. The use of the personal 
pronoun ‘you’, in particular, is shown to add complex layers of interpretation to the 
narrative and to the GPs’ statements, which may go unnoticed in a mere ‘common 
sense’ analytical approach. While in a general content analysis ‘you’ would at best 
be recognised as generic ‘you’, its reconsideration against the background of nar-
ratological discussions of similar forms in literary narratives demonstrates that ‘you’ 
in fact becomes part of a narrative strategy whereby:
1. the narrator distances himself from his own personal self on the level of the story-
world of the presented narrative and thus shifts towards a more generalized, pro-
fessional self, and 
2. at the same time tries to align the interviewer with his viewpoint through involvement 
and discursive inclusion on the level of the interview during which the narrative was 
told. 
The discussion of the narrative and non-narrative materials shows that narratologi-
cal terms can be useful if one wishes to conduct a more in-depth linguistic analysis 
of oral narratives in order to substantiate claims that might otherwise remain impres-
sionistic. If one considers the narrative from my sample through a narratological 
lens, the story becomes more complicated and reveals semantic nuances which 
are interesting for the overall interpretation of the narrative. Thus, the notion of 
social positioning, for example, can be traced in instances of focalization and in 
the complex referential frameworks of personal pronouns. However, as with any 
narratological analysis, the resulting findings have to be considered within the 
larger context of surrounding materials, in this case, the remainder of the interview, 
to avoid the pitfall of making random claims about a narrative or other discourse 
units. But then again, this kind of triangulation of data ought to be common practice 
anyway, as social scientists will confirm.
My analysis of one conversational narrative as an example and further interview 
material can of course only be a starting point for what I hope will be a fruitful 
cross-over among narratology, sociolinguistics, and other social science disci-
plines. More work needs to be done to address problems and possibilities of such 
a cross-over. For example, I have pointed towards possible difficulties concerning 
the differentiation between written, fictional discourse and non-fictional forms of 
narrative in everyday conversation. Conversational stories are also ‘messier’ than 
written narratives and may therefore require modified versions of narratological 
concepts. Furthermore, one can envisage discussions around a narrative/non-
narrative analytic divide. However, what I hope to have demonstrated with my 
paper is that more communication among scholars across disciplinary boundaries 
is needed in order to enhance the study of narratives and to avoid that the import 
of methodological tools becomes a one-way process.
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